Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District  
Baltazar Vazquez, Clerk/Executive Officer  
Electronically RECEIVED on 8/13/2025 at 11:48:19 PM  
Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District  
Baltazar Vazquez, Clerk/Executive Officer  
Electronically FILED on 8/13/2025 by J. Ornelas, Deputy Clerk  
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
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Celine E. LERMAN,  
Plaintiffs and Respondents,  
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) Appeal Ct. Dist 6th No. H053267  
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Super. Ct. No. 22FL000408  
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6TH APPELLATE DISTRICT  
Mikhael Y. LERMAN,  
Defendant and Appellant  
Appeal From an Order  
Of The Superior Court, County of Santa Clara  
Hon. Mrs. Cindy Hendrickson, Judge  
_____________________________________  
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF  
_____________________________________  
This document can be retrieved electronically with:  
Mikhael Y. Lerman  
2462 Booksin Ave, San Jose CA 95125  
408-564-9578  
https://siliconkit.com/pdf/4CA611FB-B526-4f15-  
AAD2-5EDCC3CA531E/  
[51]_Appellants_Opening_Brief.pdf  
michael_lerman@yahoo.com  
Appellant  
Self-Represented  
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[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
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TABLE OF CONTENTS  
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PREAMBLE  
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE  
INTRODUCTION  
BACKGROUND  
SUMMARY OF PROPERTY INTERESTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
OBSERVATIONS ON THE TIMING OF DISSOLUTION  
DISPROPORTIONATE FINAL JUDGMENT AND CONCERNS OVER EQUITY  
COURSE OF THE TRIAL IN 9 STEPS  
1. The 4-Minute Hearing  
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2. I Was Punished with Attorney’s Fees for Filing Motion to Uncover Hidden Assets  
3. I Discovered That the Judge and Attorney Martelle Were Pers. Connected  
4. I Filed a Complaint with the Commissioner  
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5. I Was Listed as a Vexatious Litigant  
6. Judge Hon. Zecher and Attorney Martelle Withdrew from the Case  
7. Judge Hendrickson Rendered a Default Judgment w Provision for Appeal  
8. Capture of Cherry Avenue Property During the Prohibited Appeal Period  
9. I Filed the Present Appeal Followed by a Petition to the Supreme Court  
STATEMENT OF THE APPEALABILITY  
STATEMENT OF FACTS  
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The Lerman Divorce as a Puzzle  
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The Hidden Assets  
Statement Regarding Judicial Conduct and Attorney Misconduct  
Allegations Against Mrs. Martelle  
Allegations Against Mr. Peterson  
Conspiracy Against Rights ("CAR")  
GF1: The gender of the assigned judge must match with the gender of Defendant  
1.1 Judicial Compassion and In-Group Bias  
1.2 Statistical Unlikelihood and Pattern of Assignments  
1.3 Constitutional Implications  
1.4 Restoring Public Confidence  
GF2: A Defendant should never be declared or treated as a vexatious litigant  
2.1 License to Commit Fraud by the Opposing Party  
2.2 The Defendant Does Not Choose to Be in Court  
2.3 Specific Violations Enabled by the Vexatious Label  
2.4 A Simple, Fair Rule  
GF3: The adversity of the Judge must be directed with the Plaintiff rather than with Defendant  
3.1 Why the Balance of Adversity Matters  
3.2 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law  
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[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
 
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
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3.3 Why Adversity Toward the Plaintiff Is Preferable  
3.4 Proposed Standard for Fairness  
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GF4: In absence of agreement, the ultimate judgment must allign with Defendant's positions  
4.1 Judgment Must Be Grounded in Agreement or Proven Facts  
4.2 Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof  
4.3 Irreconcilable Differences Do Not Justify Imbalanced Judgments  
4.4 Preventing One-Sided Judgments Without Foundation  
GF5: ELISOR must require a medical opinion showing a mental impairment of Defendant  
5.1 Signing Away Someone's Rights Requires Proof of Incapacity  
5.2 Capacity Is a Medical Determination —Not a Judicial Shortcut  
5.3 In My Case, No Such Diagnosis Was Ever Made  
5.4 Elisor Appointment Without Medical Basis = Judicial Overreach  
5.5 Proposed Rule for Safeguard (GF5)  
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5.6 Conclusion of GF5  
GF6: The self-represented Defendant should never pay attorney fees  
6.1 Structural Imbalance: A Shift from Two Parties to Three  
6.2 Attorney’s Fees as a Coercive Tool  
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6.3 Perverse Incentives and Judicial Dilemma  
6.4 Proposed Safeguard  
6.5 Conclusion GF6: Justice Should Not Depend on Representation  
CONCLUSION  
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT  
PROOF OF SERVICE  
CITED  
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[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
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PREAMBLE  
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In this appeal, I, Mikhael Lerman, the Defendant and Appellant, ask the Court of Appeal to  
focus on a single issue:  
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1. Whether hidden assets of the Plaintiff, Celine Lerman, exist.  
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This appeal supplements and complements the petition for review ▼ that I filed with the  
Supreme Court. The petition before the Supreme Court concerns a separate issue related  
to asset division: whether the assets must be split “equally” or “equitably.”  
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I propose the following six garde-fous (“Garde-Fou” or “GF”) measures, which serve as  
safeguards or limitations to help prevent judicial misconduct—particularly concerning the  
rights of a self-represented Defendant.  
Proposed Garde-Fou (GF) Measures:  
GF1: The gender of the assigned judge must match the gender of the Defendant.  
GF2: A Defendant should never be declared or treated as a vexatious litigant  
GF3: The adversity of the Judge must be directed toward the Plaintiff rather than the  
Defendant.  
GF4: In the absence of an agreement, the ultimate judgment must align with the  
Defendant’s positions.  
GF5: Appointment of an ELISOR must require a medical opinion showing mental  
impairment of the Defendant.  
GF6: The self-represented Defendant should never be ordered to pay attorney’s fees.  
I believe that judges currently lack the six proposed Garde-Fou measures necessary to  
ensure impartial judgment—especially in cases involving self-represented Defendants. I  
recognize the challenging nature of judicial work and the difficult decisions judges must  
make, often under pressure from unscrupulous law firms. I also wish to express my  
sympathy and respect for both Hon. Vanessa Zecher and Hon. Cindy Hendrickson.  
However, I formally accuse Attorneys Martelle and Peterson of engaging in judicial  
misconduct.  
- 4 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
   
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  
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1. Hidden assets (cited pg 21 ▼)  
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In California, the primary legal framework addressing hidden assets with a breach of  
fiduciary duty in a marital context is found in California Family Code § 721 and § 1101,  
which impose a duty of the "highest good faith and fair dealing" between spouses, akin to  
that of business partners, and outline remedies for breaches, including penalties for  
concealed assets.  
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Understanding Fiduciary Duty in Marriage:  
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• California Family Code § 721:  
This section establishes that spouses owe each other a duty of the "highest good faith and  
fair dealing" and cannot take unfair advantage of one another, with this relationship being  
equivalent to that of non-marital business partners. This includes providing accurate  
financial information and full access to financial records.  
• Concealment of Assets:  
Hiding assets during a divorce is a breach of this fiduciary duty and can lead to legal  
penalties. This could involve transferring assets to a third party, creating secret accounts, or  
purchasing assets without the other spouse's knowledge.  
California Family Code § 721 and § 1100:These codes establish the fiduciary duties  
spouses owe to each other in managing community property during marriage and even after  
separation, requiring the highest good faith, fair dealing, and transparency.  
•Specifically, under these codes, spouses are required to:  
•Provide access to financial records at all times.  
•Furnish true and full information concerning community property upon request.  
•Account for any profit obtained without the other spouse's consent in transactions related to  
community property.  
•Refrain from gifting or disposing of community personal property for less than fair value  
without the other spouse's written consent (with some exceptions).  
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[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
   
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
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•Family Code § 2102: Clarifies that these fiduciary duties continue even after separation  
until assets and liabilities are fully distributed.  
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•Family Code § 1101: Outlines the remedies for breaches of fiduciary duty, including  
awards of 50% or 100% of the undisclosed or transferred asset to the other spouse,  
depending on whether the breach involves "oppression, fraud, or malice" as defined in Civil  
Code § 3294.  
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•California Civil Code § 3294: Defines the concepts of oppression, fraud, and malice,  
which can trigger more severe penalties under Family Code § 1101(h), potentially leading to  
a 100% award of the hidden asset to the wronged spouse.  
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2. Conspiracy against rights 18 U.S. Code § 241 - Conspiracy against rights (cited pg 23 ▼)  
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or  
intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth,  
Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any  
right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of  
the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same;  
or If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the  
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free  
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured— They  
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years,  
or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of  
this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to  
kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit  
aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined  
under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or  
both, or may be sentenced to death.  
3. RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1961): (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) Act (cited  
pg 23 ▼)  
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act is a U.S.  
federal law designed to combat organized crime by targeting racketeering  
activity. Extortion, which involves obtaining something through force, threats,  
or coercion, can be a predicate act under RICO.  
In the context of RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), extortion is  
considered a racketeering activity and is defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Specifically,  
subsection (1)(A) of this section lists "extortion" as a predicate act.  
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4. California Penal code 518 of Chapter 7 Extortion [518 - 527] (cited pg 22 ▼)  
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[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
     
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
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(a) Extortion is the obtaining of property or other consideration from another,  
with his or her consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer,  
induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.  
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While RICO operates at the federal level, extortion itself can be prosecuted under state laws  
as well. In California, for example, extortion is defined under Penal Code 518 PC.  
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5. Burden of proof, presumption of innocence and adverse debate (cited pg 28 ▼)  
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Burden of Proof:  
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In civil cases, the Plaintiff must prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence.  
→ California Evidence Code § 500; CACI No. 200  
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• Presumption of Innocence / Neutrality:  
While formally applied in criminal law, civil courts must uphold fairness and avoid  
prejudging the Defendant.  
→ U.S. Constitution (5th & 14th Amendments); People v. Hill (1998)  
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• Adversarial Process:  
Judges must remain neutral, ensuring both sides are treated fairly and that the court  
does not align with one party.  
→ Tumey v. Ohio (1927); California Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3; CCP § 128(a)  
(3)  
6. Automatic Temporary Restraining Order section 4 (cited pg 12 ▼)  
(4) Restraining both parties from creating a nonprobate transfer or modifying a  
nonprobate transfer in a manner that affects the disposition of property subject  
to the transfer, without the written consent of the other party or an order of the  
court.  
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[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
   
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE  
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INTRODUCTION  
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I, Mikhael Lerman, the Defendant in this matter, bring this appeal in connection with a family  
law dispute between myself and the Plaintiff, Celine Lerman, concerning the division of  
marital assets following our separation. The primary issue I raise is whether the Plaintiff  
concealed assets that were not properly disclosed or considered during the asset division  
process.  
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As a self-represented party, I believe the trial court failed to adequately address this critical  
issue. I also raise concerns about judicial bias and procedural fairness, particularly in how  
the court handled my case as a self-represented litigant.  
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The trial court issued its ruling without granting an evidentiary hearing on the matter of  
hidden assets, despite my objections and requests for a full and fair review. I also voiced  
concerns about the conduct of opposing counsel and the lack of transparency throughout  
the proceedings. In this appeal, I respectfully ask the Court to consider not only the  
substantive legal issue but also the procedural fairness of the lower court’s handling of the  
case.  
To that end, I have proposed six Garde-Fou measures intended to serve as safeguards for  
the rights of self-represented Defendants in future proceedings.  
BACKGROUND  
I was born into a prominent Jewish family in Lebanon. Both my paternal family (Lerman)  
and maternal family (Tawil) possessed significant financial resources. My maternal  
grandfather, Itzhak Tawil, was the banking partner of Jacob Safra, father of the  
internationally renowned banker Edmond Safra, founder of Republic National Bank of New  
York. Although my grandfather passed away in 1937, his professional legacy continued  
through his sons, who were integrated into the Safra banking enterprise.  
I had the privilege of working at Republic National Bank of New York for a time. My family’s  
assets included a real estate complex consisting of 16 residential units located in Lebanon,  
commonly known as the Rachid Nakhle property. This property remains in family ownership  
to this day.  
In 1988, when I was 24 years old and a student at the Technion – Israel Institute of  
Technology, my father passed away. At that time, I inherited substantial cash assets as well  
as full ownership of the Rachid Nakhle property. I was unmarried at the time. The rental  
income from the Rachid Nakhle property provided consistent financial support until 2020,  
when Lebanon’s economic collapse—marked by hyperinflation and a banking crisis—  
effectively ended the flow of rental income.  
The Rachid Nakhle property, which I inherited well before my marriage in 1990, is my  
separate property. This fact is central to the present appeal, as the trial court improperly  
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[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
     
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
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included income derived from this separate asset in the division of community property—an  
action I believe violates both the California Family Code § 2550 and constitutional  
protections of property rights.  
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Two years after receiving my inheritance, I married my now ex-wife, Celine Lerman. Our  
marriage was formally dissolved on April 3, 2025. During our marriage, we acquired six  
properties that are part of the community estate. Celine came from a middle-class family  
with sufficient means to maintain a comfortable lifestyle.  
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Shortly after our marriage, we lived in a rented apartment on Rue Louis Blanc in Paris. A  
few months later, Celine’s family provided us with a larger apartment on Rue Oberkampf. At  
the time, she was pursuing her Master’s degree at the Sorbonne, while I was employed by a  
company named Normerel.  
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The Rue Oberkampf apartment was not initially habitable—it lacked a proper bathroom and  
had only a shower in the kitchen. Using funds from my inheritance, I personally financed  
and oversaw the remodeling of the apartment to make it livable. Although the property was  
provided by her family, the financial investment and improvements were made entirely with  
my separate funds. This apartment became our first jointly occupied residence, and it is  
where our daughter, Avigael, was born.  
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I built a successful career as a computer engineer. A pivotal opportunity came when I joined  
STMicroelectronics, which enabled me to emigrate to the United States with Celine and our  
two children, Avigael and Joachim. During that time, I earned a comfortable income, which  
was further supplemented by rental income from the Rachid Nakhle property.  
These combined resources allowed me to acquire three residential properties in the Willow  
Glen neighborhood of San Jose in relatively quick succession. My wife, Celine, did not  
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using my professional income and assets I had acquired prior to marriage. These properties  
should therefore be recognized as having been funded by separate property.  
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Additionally, Celine’s brother, Gerald, lives rent-free in the Rue Oberkampf apartment until  
now. Despite my objections, Celine refused to request rent from him and did not contribute  
to any expenses related to the Willow Glen properties.  
SUMMARY OF PROPERTY INTERESTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
Of the six properties acquired during the marriage, two—Rue de Maubeuge and Rue  
Oberkampf, both located in Paris—were provided by my ex-wife Celine’s family. I  
acknowledge that these properties should be primarily attributed to her family’s support and  
her own merit.  
In contrast, the three properties located in the Willow Glen neighborhood of San Jose—  
Booksin Avenue, Cherry Avenue, and Settle Avenue—were acquired solely through my  
financial contributions. These funds came from my professional employment as well as  
separate rental income generated by the Rachid Nakhle property in Lebanon, which I  
inherited prior to marriage. These three Willow Glen properties should be recognized as the  
result of my individual financial efforts and treated accordingly in any equitable division.  
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[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
 
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
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A sixth property, an apartment on Rue Courat in Paris, was jointly acquired during the  
marriage. Based on documented financial records, 74% of the purchase price was paid from  
my separate or earned income, while 26% was contributed by Celine. I respectfully request  
that the division of equity in this property reflect these proportional contributions.  
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It is also important to clarify that the rental income from the Rachid Nakhle property—my  
separate asset—ceased in 2020 due to the severe economic collapse in Lebanon. This  
cessation of income occurred two years prior to Celine’s initiation of divorce proceedings in  
February 2022.  
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OBSERVATIONS ON THE TIMING OF DISSOLUTION  
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In 2020, the rental income from my separate property, the Rachid Nakhle estate in  
Lebanon, ceased due to the country’s severe economic crisis. This loss marked a significant  
change in our financial circumstances, as that income had supported our household for  
many years.  
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Following this development, and notably without any significant marital discord at that time,  
my ex-wife Celine filed for divorce in February 2022. While I do not dispute her legal right to  
initiate dissolution proceedings, the timing and context suggest that the cessation of my  
separate income may have influenced her decision.  
Under California law, community property is divided equally upon dissolution. With the  
termination of my separate revenue stream, a long-standing financial imbalance in the  
marriage was removed—effectively making divorce more advantageous to her from a purely  
economic perspective.  
DISPROPORTIONATE FINAL JUDGMENT AND CONCERNS OVER EQUITY  
At the outset of the dissolution proceedings, I expected the division of property to fairly  
reflect the respective merits and contributions of each party. Specifically, I anticipated that  
my ex-wife would retain the properties primarily provided by her family—Rue de Maubeuge  
and Rue Oberkampf—while I would retain the three Willow Glen properties, which I  
acquired and financed solely through my own efforts and income. The Rue Courat property,  
to which both parties contributed, was to be divided according to our respective  
contributions—74% to me and 26% to her.  
However, the final judgment issued by the Superior Court awarded five of the six community  
properties to my ex-wife, leaving only one property in my name. This result is deeply  
inequitable and disregards both the financial realities of our marriage and the principles of  
fairness embedded in California law.  
While California is a community property state that generally requires equal division, a rigid  
application of this standard—without consideration of the actual source of funds or efforts—  
can produce unjust outcomes, as has occurred here.  
I must also highlight the difficulties I faced as a self-represented litigant. The complexity of  
the legal process, combined with systemic barriers and what at times appeared to be  
institutional bias favoring experienced legal professionals, raises serious concerns about the  
impartiality of the proceedings. Though I do not directly accuse the judges of misconduct, I  
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[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
   
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
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respectfully urge the Court to consider how informal alliances or professional familiarity  
among legal actors may influence outcomes, particularly when one party lacks formal  
representation.  
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COURSE OF THE TRIAL IN 9 STEPS  
1. The 4-Minute Hearing  
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On September 28, 2022, I attended a hearing during which I attempted to present evidence  
regarding hidden assets belonging to the Plaintiff. The hearing lasted only four minutes—  
from 2:53 PM to 2:57 PM—and during that time, I was repeatedly interrupted by the Court  
and unable to complete full responses to questions. The only uninterrupted statement I was  
able to make was the phrase “two, three and four,” in reference to the court orders I alleged  
were violated. Despite my efforts, the Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion without addressing  
the substance of my claims or permitting a meaningful presentation of my evidence.  
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The Plaintiff and her counsel were not asked to respond or explain. The Court did not  
inquire into the alleged hidden assets, nor did it confront the Plaintiff about the violation of  
the Automatic Temporary Restraining Orders (ATROs). As a result, the adversarial tone of  
the hearing appeared directed solely at me as the self-represented Defendant. Meanwhile,  
the Plaintiff’s attorney, Ms. Martelle, appeared to receive the benefit of the Court’s  
deference, raising concerns about impartiality.  
The transcript of this hearing is available in exhibit TR ▼  
Selected excerpt from the transcript:  
• Court: “As I understand it, the contempt citation states that by revoking the Trust, Ms.  
Lerman was in violation of the automatic temporary restraining orders. Is that the  
basis of your contempt citation?”  
• Me: “Not only.”  
• Court: “Okay.”  
• Me: “There are several. This is one of them.”  
• Court: “This is so technical, okay. So your moving papers do not tell me exactly what  
orders were violated—”  
• Me: “Yes, I know. I did—” (cut off)  
• Court: “Can I finish, please.”  
• Me: “Yeah.”  
• Court: “…what orders were violated and what Ms. Lerman did to violate them. I am  
looking at the moving papers. You do not get to supplement them with argument so I  
need you to refer me specifically in your papers to what order or orders were violated  
- 11 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
     
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
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and what you contend. And it can only be in your papers, it cannot be outside the  
papers.”  
• Me: “Correct. I refer to order number two, three and four.”  
• Court: “Okay. In what portion of your paperwork?”  
• Me: “I listed two actions that lead to this—” (cut off)  
• Court: “I need to know exactly what orders were violated and—”  
• Me: “It—” (cut off)  
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• Court: “Okay, Mr. Lerman, I AM NOT PLAYING A GAME HERE. THIS IS NOT A  
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GAME.”  
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• Me: “It's in my paper,” (cut off)  
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• Court: “Okay, Ms. Martelle, your motion is granted.”  
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This brief and one-sided hearing was not an isolated procedural event. It proved to be  
central to the course of the entire trial. By dismissing the issue of hidden assets without a  
proper evidentiary hearing, the Court effectively foreclosed further consideration of this key  
issue, setting the tone for the remainder of the proceedings. From that point onward, my  
attempts to raise concerns about asset concealment were largely disregarded.  
Prior to this hearing, the Plaintiff had revoked a nonprobate (▲) transfer and executed a  
new will—actions that, in my view, violated Section 4 of the ATROs. Notably, the new will  
omitted the Rue de Maubeuge and Rue Oberkampf properties, despite her clear connection  
to both. This omission supports my claim that these assets were intentionally hidden. In  
support of my position, I submitted detailed documentation, including:  
• Donation-Partage document (▼) for Rue de Maubeuge (see Exhibit Q)  
• Private investigation report (▼) from Fox Detective (see Exhibit HA Recherche de  
Patrimoine)  
• Power of Attorney documents related to financial accounts (see Exhibit CE:  
Power_of_Attorney_and_Perimetre_of_Accounts.pdf)  
• Plaintiff’s Schedule of Assets and Debts (Exhibit P ▼), which failed to list these  
properties and accounts  
During discovery, I asked Attorney Martelle about the omission of these assets. She replied  
that the information was privileged between her and the Plaintiff. I believe this response  
effectively confirms her awareness of the concealed assets, and it suggests that she  
knowingly participated in suppressing material evidence. In my view, this constitutes a  
breach of ethical duties and a complicity in concealing assets material to the fair division of  
property.  
Following the September 28, 4-minute hearing, Attorney Martelle employed various tactics  
that appeared aimed at obstructing any further inquiry into the hidden assets. These  
included:  
- 12 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
       
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
• Efforts to have me declared a vexatious litigant  
• Issuance of 24 subpoenas containing misleading or unsubstantiated allegations  
• Threatening and intimidating behavior intended to deter me from pursuing my claims  
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It is my belief that both Attorney Martelle and her associate, Attorney Peterson, were aware  
of the concealed assets and actively worked to prevent their disclosure. Their actions  
suggest a coordinated effort to suppress evidence relevant to the equitable division of  
marital property. I respectfully submit that this conduct—along with the Court’s unwillingness  
to hear my evidence—undermined the fairness of the trial and violated my right to due  
process.  
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2. I Was Punished with Attorney’s Fees for Filing Motion to Uncover Hidden Assets  
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After attempting to bring to light the existence of hidden assets through a formal motion, I  
was sanctioned with attorney’s fees—despite being self-represented and acting in good  
faith to protect my legal rights and ensure full disclosure in the proceedings.  
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The Court ordered me to pay attorney’s fees on two separate occasions:  
• First, before the division of community assets, attorney’s fees were ordered to be  
paid directly from the community account, significantly reducing the overall funds  
available for equal distribution.  
• Second, following the division of property, I was again ordered to pay attorney’s fees  
—this time from my separate share of the assets. This punitive measure directly  
reduced the portion of the estate awarded to me, despite the fact that the motion I  
filed was centered on a legitimate and unresolved issue: the concealment of  
significant marital assets by the Plaintiff.  
The total amount assessed against me for attorney’s fees approached $100,000, a  
staggering figure for any self-represented litigant, let alone one who was merely attempting  
to ensure transparency and proper classification of community versus separate property.  
What is particularly troubling is that I was penalized not for any misconduct or frivolous  
litigation—but for exercising my right to seek discovery and judicial review of potentially  
concealed marital assets. My efforts were reasonable, supported by documented evidence,  
and directly relevant to the fair adjudication of property rights under California law.  
Instead of being heard, I was met with financial punishment. This outcome reflects a  
systemic disadvantage faced by self-represented litigants and raises serious questions  
about access to justice, judicial impartiality, and whether equal protection under the law was  
afforded in this case.  
3. I Discovered That the Judge and Attorney Martelle Were Personally Connected  
On April 24, 2023, I became aware of a significant conflict of interest that, in my view,  
fundamentally undermined the fairness and neutrality of the proceedings. I discovered that  
- 13 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
   
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
Attorney Martelle maintained a personal relationship with the presiding judge, the Honorable  
Vanessa Zecher, and that the two were engaged in regular ex parte communication.  
This revelation was deeply troubling, as it raised serious concerns regarding judicial  
impartiality, potential bias, and due process violations in my case. I promptly submitted  
evidence of this communication in Exhibit EX – Ex Parte Communication (▼)  
(Exhibit_EX_exparte_communication.pdf), which I believe demonstrates a level of  
familiarity and informal contact that is incompatible with the ethical standards required in a  
judicial proceeding—particularly in a contested divorce trial involving high-value assets and  
an unrepresented party.  
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Ex parte communications between a judge and one party’s counsel—especially if they  
concern matters relevant to an active case—are strictly prohibited under judicial ethics  
rules. Even the appearance of partiality can compromise the legitimacy of a judgment. As a  
self-represented litigant, I had no way of knowing these communications were occurring,  
and I was never granted a corresponding opportunity to be heard or to respond.  
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The existence of such a relationship between the bench and opposing counsel casts a long  
shadow over the procedural and substantive fairness of the trial. It also may explain the  
courtroom dynamics I experienced throughout the litigation—where I was repeatedly  
interrupted, my evidence was dismissed without proper review, and the Plaintiff’s motions  
were routinely granted with minimal scrutiny.  
In light of this discovery, I respectfully submit that the integrity of the trial was fundamentally  
compromised, and the resulting judgment cannot be considered the product of a neutral and  
impartial adjudication.  
4. I Filed a Complaint with the Commissioner  
After discovering what I believe to be improper ex parte communications between the  
presiding judge, Hon. Vanessa Zecher, and opposing counsel, Attorney Martelle, I formally  
filed a complaint with the appropriate judicial oversight authority.  
On or around April 2023, I submitted a detailed letter outlining the nature of my concerns,  
including potential judicial bias and violations of judicial ethics. This letter was addressed to  
the Commission on Judicial Performance and is included in the record as Exhibit COM  
(▼) – Letter to the Commissioner. The full document is available at the following URL:  
https://siliconkit.com/pdf/4CA611FB-B526-4f15-AAD2-5EDCC3CA531E/Exhibit_COM_letter_commissioner.pdf  
In the letter, I described:  
• The personal relationship between Judge Zecher and Attorney Martelle  
• The pattern of judicial conduct in my case that I believe reflected partiality  
• My inability to obtain a fair hearing or due consideration of my motions and evidence  
This filing was not done lightly. As a self-represented litigant, I pursued this action only after  
observing repeated instances of courtroom dynamics that strongly suggested preferential  
treatment of the Plaintiff’s counsel, and an adversarial stance toward me.  
- 14 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
     
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
To date, I have not been informed of a serious response or investigation resulting from the  
complaint, but I include it here in the record of this appeal to demonstrate that I took  
appropriate steps to raise the issue through the channels available to me.  
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5. I Was Listed as a Vexatious Litigant  
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Following my efforts to expose the existence of hidden assets and my formal complaint  
regarding potential judicial misconduct, I was unexpectedly designated a vexatious litigant  
by the Court. This decision had serious consequences, effectively restricting my ability to file  
motions or petitions without prior judicial approval.  
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This designation was imposed despite the fact that:  
• I was acting as a self-represented litigant, without the benefit of legal counsel  
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• My filings were based on substantive concerns, including documented evidence of  
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undisclosed marital property  
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• I had exercised my legal rights in good faith, including the right to discovery and the  
right to petition for enforcement of court orders  
The vexatious litigant label is a serious and stigmatizing measure, typically reserved for  
individuals who abuse the judicial process through repetitive, meritless filings. In my case,  
the record shows that I was seeking to defend my property rights and ensure fairness in a  
complex divorce case where significant financial information remained in dispute.  
I believe this designation was misapplied and was used—intentionally or not—as a tool to  
silence my efforts to uncover critical facts. It had the effect of discrediting my motions in  
advance and discouraged further judicial review of the Plaintiff’s financial disclosures.  
This action also compounded the systemic imbalance I faced throughout the proceedings:  
while the Plaintiff had the benefit of experienced legal counsel and a favorable courtroom  
posture, I was placed under increasing procedural and financial pressure simply for  
asserting my legal rights.  
6. Judge Hon. Zecher and Attorney Martelle Withdrew from the Case  
As the case progressed, I took formal action to challenge the constitutionality and  
impartiality of the judicial assignment process, as well as the integrity and courtroom  
familiarity of opposing counsel, Attorney Martelle.  
Specifically, I submitted a written objection to the assignment of Judge Cindy Hendrickson,  
citing concerns about unconstitutional judicial assignment procedures. This objection was  
detailed in Exhibit PRS – Strike Assignment of Judge Cindy Hendrickson (▼)  
In addition, I formally contested the courtroom familiarity and conduct of Attorney Martelle,  
raising concerns about her prior ex parte communications with the Court and what I  
perceived as a persistent lack of neutrality in her interactions with the bench.  
As a result of these filings and objections:  
• Judge Hon. Vanessa Zecher withdrew or was removed from the case  
- 15 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
     
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
• Attorney Martelle also withdrew or was disqualified from further participation in the  
proceedings  
While no official statement was provided to me explaining the reasons for their withdrawal,  
the timing suggests that these actions were taken in direct response to the issues I raised  
concerning impartiality and judicial ethics. Their departure from the case marked a  
significant turning point and implicitly acknowledged that my concerns had at least some  
merit.  
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However, by the time these changes occurred, substantial damage had already been done  
—procedural rights had been curtailed, critical evidence had been excluded, and financial  
decisions had been made that I believe were deeply prejudicial.  
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7. Judge Hendrickson Rendered a Default Judgment with Provision for Appeal  
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On April 3, 2025, Judge Hon. Cindy Hendrickson issued a default judgment against me in  
the underlying dissolution case. This judgment is documented in Exhibit MNO (▼) –  
Minute Order (April 3, 2025), available at the following link:  
Exhibit_MNO_MINUTE_ORDER_APRIL_3_2025.pdf  
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This judgment was entered despite the fact that I had participated extensively in prior  
proceedings, filed multiple motions, and raised unresolved issues—including the  
concealment of assets and judicial conflicts of interest. The judgment declared me in default  
and moved the case forward without a full evidentiary hearing on key matters I had raised.  
Importantly, the minute order granted a 60-day period, beginning from April 3, 2025,  
during which I was permitted to file for appeal or further relief. This provision suggests that  
the Court recognized the unusual nature of the default and the need to preserve my  
appellate rights.  
Additionally, the Court appointed an ELISOR to sign documents on my behalf. The  
appointment of an ELISOR—typically used when a party refuses or is unavailable to  
execute documents—was applied here in a context where I had been actively participating  
in the case. I contend that this action was inappropriate and further eroded my procedural  
rights as a self-represented litigant.  
At this stage, the judgment finalized the distribution of community and separate assets—  
despite ongoing disputes about classification, contribution, and the concealment of  
properties such as Rue de Maubeuge and Rue Oberkampf. This default judgment, entered  
under these circumstances, forms the basis for my present appeal.  
8. Capture of Cherry Avenue Property During the Prohibited Appeal Period  
On April 5, 2025, just two days after the default judgment was entered on April 3, and well  
within the 60-day appeal period, the Plaintiff, Celine Lerman, along with her attorney Mr.  
Larry Peterson, executed the transfer and took possession of the Cherry Avenue  
property in San Jose, California—valued at approximately $2.5 million.  
This action was carried out despite the explicit provision in the judgment granting a 60-day  
window for appeal or further relief. The transfer occurred during a period in which all parties  
were expected to refrain from irreversible actions affecting property rights, particularly  
- 16 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
     
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
involving assets under dispute. The premature enforcement of the judgment in this manner  
represents, in my view, a violation of procedural fairness and may constitute real estate  
fraud.  
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I have submitted documentation of this unauthorized transfer in Exhibit DED (▼) – Deed  
Real Estate Fraud, available at:  
https://siliconkit.com/pdf/4CA611FB-B526-4f15-AAD2-5EDCC3CA531E/Exhibit_DED_DEED_Real_Estate_Fraud.pdf  
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This act raises several critical legal and ethical concerns:  
• Violation of the 60-day stay provision for appeal  
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• Disregard for due process and the pending appellate timeline  
• Unilateral seizure of an asset still under legal dispute  
• Potential fraudulent conveyance of community or contested property  
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The Cherry Avenue property is one of the three assets I acquired solely through my  
professional earnings and separate property income. Its forced and premature transfer not  
only deprived me of property but also further entrenched the inequitable outcome that this  
appeal seeks to challenge.  
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I respectfully submit that this incident underscores the broader pattern in this case: a  
systematic denial of my rights as a litigant, a lack of judicial protection for the appeal  
process, and the aggressive actions of the opposing party to capitalize on procedural  
vulnerabilities before appellate review could occur.  
9. I Filed the Present Appeal Followed by a Petition to the Supreme Court  
In response to the default judgment rendered on April 3, 2025, and the premature transfer of  
the Cherry Avenue property on April 5, 2025, I exercised my legal right to challenge the  
proceedings by filing the present appeal within the 60-day period granted by the Court.  
The appeal specifically addresses:  
• The existence of hidden assets not accounted for in the division of property  
• The procedural irregularities and ex parte communications between the judge and  
opposing counsel  
• The disproportionate and unjust division of community and separate assets  
• The improper designation of vexatious litigant status  
• The default judgment entered despite my ongoing participation  
• The appointment of an ELISOR to override my legal agency  
• The unlawful transfer of contested property during the appeal period  
Following this appeal, I also submitted a Petition for Review to the Supreme Court of  
California, addressing a separate but closely related legal question:  
Whether the division of marital assets must be conducted "equally" or "equitably"  
under California law—a question with broader constitutional and statutory implications  
beyond the facts of my specific case.  
- 17 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
   
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
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The issues raised in this appeal and in the Supreme Court petition highlight systemic  
problems facing self-represented litigants, including lack of access to impartial  
proceedings, procedural disadvantages, and inadequate protection against legal overreach  
by represented parties.  
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- 18 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
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STATEMENT OF THE APPEALABILITY  
-▲-  
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This Judgment is appealable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision  
(a)(1), as it constitutes a final judgment adjudicating the dissolution of the parties' marriage  
and related matters. The Court has granted a Judgment of Dissolution based on  
irreconcilable differences, terminating marital status effective April 3, 2025, and has made  
final rulings regarding the division of personal property and other related orders. As such,  
this Judgment is final and subject to appeal.  
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The notice of appeal is not premature under California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(1), as  
the judgment has been rendered and is therefore valid for purposes of appeal, even if not  
yet entered.  
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- 19 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
 
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS  
-▲-  
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The following are relevant dates of property acquisitions in relation to the dates of marriage  
and separation:  
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• Rue Rachid Nakhle, Lebanon – Acquired: April 6, 1988 (evidence, p. 5, l. 13)  
• Marriage – October 17, 1990 (evidence)  
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• Rue de Maubeuge, Paris, France – Acquired: August 5, 1999 (evidence, p. 6, l. 5)  
• Cherry Avenue, San Jose – Acquired: July 19, 2001  
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• Settle Avenue, San Jose – Acquired: July 6, 2007  
• Booksin Avenue, San Jose – Acquired: November 22, 2010  
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• Rue Oberkampf, Paris, France – Acquired: December 20, 2013 (evidence, p. 18, l.  
8)  
• Rue Courat, Paris, France – Acquired: July 1, 2019 (evidence, p. 3, l. 14)  
• Date of Separation – February 6, 2023 (evidence, p. 11, l. 5)  
The property located at Rue Rachid Nakhle, Lebanon was acquired by the Defendant prior  
to the marriage and is therefore the Defendant’s separate property. The remaining six  
properties were acquired during the marriage and are properly characterized as community  
property of the parties.  
- 20 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
 
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
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ARGUMENT  
-▲-  
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The Lerman Divorce as a Puzzle  
Divorces often unfold as complex puzzles. The task of the court is to analyze the pieces  
carefully, listen to both sides, and reconstruct the truth. Unfortunately, in my case, the  
Superior Court of Santa Clara failed to do this. Rather than resolving the dispute based on  
merit and evidence, the process became unbalanced and one-sided, silencing my attempts  
to uncover the truth.  
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As outlined in Exhibit_PZL  
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The Lerman divorce pzzule (▼)  
see  
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https://siliconkit.com/pdf/4CA611FB-B526-4f15-AAD2-  
5EDCC3CA531E/Exhibit_PZL_puzzle.pdf  
The Hidden Assets (▲)  
At the center of this appeal lies a simple and unavoidable truth: either the hidden assets  
exist or they do not. If they do not exist, then the burden of proof should lie with the  
Plaintiff to demonstrate their absence. If they do exist — and I have provided compelling  
evidence that they do — then they are by definition hidden and should have been disclosed  
under California law.  
Hidden assets cannot remain hidden forever. It is the duty of the Court to investigate, not to  
ignore.  
- Key Hidden Assets  
The two principal properties in question are:  
• Rue de Maubeuge (Paris, France)  
• Rue Oberkampf (Paris, France)  
I have consistently maintained that these two properties were concealed during discovery  
and omitted from the Plaintiff’s asset disclosure, in violation of her legal obligations.  
- Submitted Evidence  
I submitted a variety of supporting documents to demonstrate the existence of these hidden  
assets:  
• Detective Report: I hired a professional investigator in France who produced a  
report confirming occupancy and relevance of Rue Oberkampf.  
- 21 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
       
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
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• Photos: (▼) Documented presence and usage of Rue Oberkampf as a family  
property.  
Exhibit_OP_Oberkampf_Photos.pdf  
• Family Video: A personal family video showing Rue Oberkampf (▼) and its  
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significance in our shared history.  
Exhibit_VID_Family_video_rue_oberkampf.pdf  
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• Personal Declaration: I provided a sworn declaration (▼) testifying to the facts  
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surrounding the property.  
[32]_Oberkampf_facts.pdf  
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• Power of Attorney Documents: Additional evidence (▼) suggests that Plaintiff had  
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control over certain financial accounts tied to hidden property.  
Exhibit_CE_Power_of_Attorney_and_Perimetre_of_accounts.pdf  
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Despite all this, the Superior Court refused to conduct a proper evidentiary hearing on these  
matters. The Court never confronted the Plaintiff about these hidden assets, nor required  
her to explain the omission. This failure to act raises legitimate and serious concerns  
about impartiality and due process.  
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A Central Issue in This Appeal  
The existence of hidden assets — and the Court’s unwillingness to investigate them — is  
central to this appeal. The integrity of the judgment depends on full disclosure, fair  
analysis, and impartial proceedings. None of these standards were met.  
Statement Regarding Judicial Conduct and Attorney Misconduct  
Regarding the judicial conduct in the matter involving the law offices of Martelle and  
Peterson:  
I want to make clear that I am not accusing the Judge, for whom I have both sympathy  
and respect. However, it appears that the Judge may be under external pressure from  
Mrs. Martelle’s office to designate her as the prevailing party, thereby securing her  
compensation in this case.  
I do not accuse Judge Zecher, who agreed to withdraw from the case. I appreciate that  
decision and view her withdrawal as a recognition that this was not a fair trial. Therefore, I  
am not accusing the court of deprivation of rights under color of law.  
I recognize the difficult position the Judge is in—balancing between satisfying her coworker,  
Mrs. Martelle (or Peterson), with their compensation demands, and attempting to render fair  
justice.  
I also do not accuse Judge Hendrickson, who intervened to stop the ongoing threats from  
Mr. Peterson.  
Allegations Against Mrs. Martelle  
Extortion, Threatening Behavior, and Harassment: (▲)  
- 22 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
             
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
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• Extortion evidence: (▼)  
Exhibit ET – Extortion by Allan and Martelle LLP  
• Threatening evidence: (▼)  
Exhibit TH – Threatening  
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I accuse Mrs. Martelle of corrupting the court. Therefore, my accusation of conspiracy  
against rights against both Mrs. Martelle and Mr. Peterson remains.  
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Ex Parte Communication  
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I also found that Mrs. Martelle was engaged in ex parte communication with the Judge,  
for which I have provided evidence:  
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• Exhibit EX – Ex Parte Communication  
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I filed a formal complaint with the judicial commission regarding this misconduct:  
• Letter to Commissioner  
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Booksin Appraisal Misconduct  
With respect to Mrs. Martelle’s handling of the Booksin property appraisal:  
The appraiser, Mr. David Dietrich, located at 1975 Hamilton Avenue #34, was supposed to  
act as an independent third party, selected through a lottery process organized by the  
court and hired by me. However, Mrs. Martelle took control of the appraiser and  
directed him with specific instructions on how to conduct the appraisal. To this day, I  
have not received the appraisal report from Mr. Dietrich, yet Mrs. Martelle arranged for  
the court to order that I owe $175,000 to her party.  
I believe Mrs. Martelle’s office operates like an organized crime ring, using mafia-style  
tactics. (▲)  
• Martelle Misconduct Report  
Allegations Against Mr. Peterson  
I accuse Mr. Peterson of threatening me with financial harm, including using the term  
"bleed" (▼) in reference to attorney fees:  
• Exhibit BLE – Attorney Fee Threats  
Mr. Peterson also issued an ultimatum (▼), further escalating the threats:  
• Exhibit ULT – Ultimatum from Peterson  
Conspiracy Against Rights ("CAR") (▲)  
To be guilty of conspiracy against rights (CAR), it is not necessary to fully deprive  
someone of their rights; even an attempt or agreement to do so is sufficient. Conspiracy  
involves coordinated intent and action by two or more people.  
In this case, there is sufficient evidence of a coordinated effort between:  
- 23 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
             
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
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• Mrs. Martelle  
• Mrs. Lerman  
• Mr. Peterson  
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All parties knew about hidden assets and acted in a manner that aimed to injure, oppress,  
threaten, or intimidate me. Thus, I assert that all legal requirements for a CAR violation  
have been met.  
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Therefore, I maintain that Mrs. Martelle, Mr. Peterson, and the Plaintiff are guilty of  
conspiracy against rights.  
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Arguments for the proposed 6 garde-fous  
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GF1: The gender of the assigned judge must match with the gender of Defendant  
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GF1 proposes that in family law trials—especially those involving deeply personal matters  
such as divorce and asset division—the gender of the first assigned judge should match  
the gender of the Defendant. This safeguard is meant to preserve neutrality,  
counterbalance unconscious bias, and uphold the constitutional guarantee of equal  
protection under the law.  
1.1 Judicial Compassion and In-Group Bias  
Human empathy is not evenly distributed. Studies in cognitive science and social  
psychology have repeatedly shown that people often exhibit greater compassion,  
understanding, and emotional identification with members of their own gender. In  
courtrooms, where judges wield discretion and interpret complex personal circumstances,  
such in-group bias can subtly influence outcomes—even when unintended.  
When a Defendant (especially one who is self-represented) appears before a judge of the  
opposite gender, they may be at a probabilistic disadvantage due to these unconscious  
leanings. Aligning judge and Defendant gender introduces a natural check that can temper  
the risk of uneven treatment and ensure that the Defendant feels equally understood and  
represented in the courtroom environment.  
1.2 Statistical Unlikelihood and Pattern of Assignments  
In my own case, I was assigned three consecutive female judges in Santa Clara County  
—despite identifying as male. The probability of such a sequence occurring randomly  
(50% × 50% × 50%) is only 12.5%, suggesting a potentially non-random or systemically  
biased pattern in judicial assignments. This is especially concerning in family law, where  
gender dynamics are often at the heart of the legal dispute.  
Following my formal letter to the presiding judge (see  
Exhibit_PRS_strike_assignment_of_judge_Cindy_Hendrickson.pdf), a notable procedural change  
occurred: the public court display system, which previously listed judges' first and last  
- 24 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
     
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
names (allowing the public to infer gender), was altered to no longer display those  
names. This change raises concern that the existing distribution of judge gender  
assignments was visibly imbalanced and possibly inconsistent with constitutional fairness.  
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1.3 Constitutional Implications  
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Equal protection under the law (14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution) prohibits any form of  
gender-based favoritism by government institutions—including courts. If a court system,  
whether by algorithm or design, systematically favors assigning female judges in cases  
involving female Plaintiffs or male Defendants, that constitutes gender-based judicial  
discrimination.  
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GF1 seeks to neutralize this risk by proposing a simple, symmetrical rule:  
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The gender of the first assigned judge in a family law matter should match the  
gender of the Defendant.  
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This would rebalance perception and reduce the likelihood of implicit gender-based  
alignment with one party—particularly in sensitive, high-stakes cases like dissolution,  
custody, or asset division.  
1.4 Restoring Public Confidence  
Even if no explicit bias exists, public perception of fairness is essential to the legitimacy of  
the legal system. A litigant who sees that all judges assigned to their case are of a different  
gender—while their adversary shares the judge’s gender—may reasonably question  
whether justice is being served or gender preference is being practiced.  
GF1 is not about discrimination—it’s about restoring equilibrium, countering unconscious  
alignment, and ensuring that every Defendant feels that their voice is heard by  
someone who understands them without bias.  
GF2: A Defendant should never be declared or treated as a vexatious litigant  
2.1 Leading Argument: It's a License to Commit Fraud by the Opposing Party  
When a Defendant is placed on the vexatious litigant list, it effectively disarms them, while  
granting the opposing party and their legal team unchecked freedom. This imbalance  
creates what is essentially a license to commit fraud—a situation where one side can act  
freely, knowing the other is restricted from responding or objecting.  
In my own case, being placed on the vexatious litigant list gave the Plaintiff, Celine  
Lerman, and her attorneys, Mrs. Martelle and Mr. Peterson, permission to proceed  
unchallenged. They knew I could not file without prior approval, and they took advantage of  
that to violate court orders, seize property, and disregard agreed-upon arrangements—all  
without consequence.  
- 25 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
       
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
2.2 The Defendant Does Not Choose to Be in Court  
It is essential to understand the distinction between Plaintiffs and Defendants:  
• A Plaintiff chooses to bring a case to court.  
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• A Defendant is summoned—forced to defend themselves under threat of legal or  
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financial loss.  
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Punishing a Defendant—who never sought out litigation—for defending their civil rights is  
not only unjust, it is illogical. You cannot force someone into court, and then, when they  
resist unlawful action or raise legitimate concerns, label them vexatious for asserting their  
rights.  
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That’s exactly what happened here.  
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2.3 Specific Violations Enabled by the Vexatious Label  
Once I was placed on the vexatious litigant list, the Plaintiff and her legal team disregarded  
multiple court orders:  
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• They failed to pay half the rent on the Cherry Avenue property, despite a clear  
court order.  
• The court required joint consent for any action regarding Cherry Avenue, yet  
Plaintiff acted unilaterally.  
• The Plaintiff refused to participate in maintenance and repairs, knowing I was  
legally blocked from opposing her actions or seeking relief without pre-approval.  
This was not a breakdown in communication. It was a calculated exploitation of my  
restricted status.  
2.4 A Simple, Fair Rule  
For all of the above reasons, I propose that California courts adopt a clear safeguard:  
No Defendant—especially a self-represented Defendant—may be added to  
the vexatious litigant list.  
This rule would protect against abuse of the legal system and prevent one-sided  
enforcement. It ensures that no litigant is stripped of the right to defend themselves,  
especially in cases involving property, civil rights, or accusations of bad faith.  
GF3: The adversity of the Judge must be directed with the Plaintiff rather than with  
Defendant.  
GF3 proposes that, in proceedings involving a self-represented Defendant, judicial  
adversity—meaning critical questioning or adversarial dialogue—should be directed  
toward the Plaintiff, particularly where the Plaintiff is represented by counsel. This  
- 26 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
       
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
safeguard is necessary to preserve procedural neutrality, prevent institutional bias, and  
protect against the deprivation of civil rights under color of law.  
3.1. Why the Balance of Adversity Matters  
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In adversarial legal systems, courts are not meant to side with one party over another but to  
ensure that both sides are held to legal standards. However, when a judge’s critical scrutiny  
falls disproportionately on the self-represented party, the trial ceases to be a balanced  
forum and becomes a tilted confrontation—one where the Plaintiff benefits from both legal  
representation and judicial alignment.  
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This imbalance risks turning a legal proceeding into a form of state-enabled deprivation of  
rights, particularly when the self-represented party is trying to assert constitutional or  
statutory protections.  
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3.2. Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law  
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When a judge, consciously or not, adopts the posture of the Plaintiff’s advocate, this  
creates a situation dangerously close to conspiracy against rights (18 U.S. Code §ꢀ241)  
and deprivation of rights under color of law (18 U.S. Code §ꢀ242). These statutes were  
enacted to prevent precisely this kind of misuse of judicial or governmental authority.  
A judge who appears aligned with a represented party—even subtly—may inadvertently  
facilitate the Plaintiff’s strategy to overpower the self-represented litigant, especially when  
critical rights, property, or due process are at stake.  
3.3 Why Adversity Toward the Plaintiff Is Preferable  
When the Plaintiff challenges the rights of the Defendant (e.g., seeks to seize assets, deny  
access, or impose sanctions), it is legally and ethically appropriate for the judge to  
scrutinize the Plaintiff's claims with particular care. Challenging another person’s rights  
inherently invites scrutiny. The Plaintiff, by asking the court to impose legal  
consequences on another, should bear the burden of proof and withstand judicial  
examination.  
On the other hand, when the Defendant is merely defending their position—or seeking to  
assert fundamental rights—the court’s adversarial posture should be restrained. Anything  
else risks turning the bench into a second opposing party.  
3.4. Proposed Standard for Fairness  
To avoid the appearance or reality of judicial collusion or institutional coercion, GF3  
suggests a simple rule:  
In matters involving a self-represented Defendant, judicial adversity or scrutiny  
should, as a rule of prudence, be directed toward the represented Plaintiff, who  
has legal assistance and the benefit of counsel.  
This preserves the balance of the adversarial system and protects vulnerable litigants from  
undue hardship or loss of rights.  
- 27 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
       
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
GF4: In absence of agreement, the ultimate judgment must allign with Defendant's  
positions.  
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GF4 proposes that when there is no agreement or settlement between the parties, the  
final judgment should, by default, align with the Defendant’s positions, especially when  
the Defendant is self-represented. This principle is supported by three core foundations: the  
presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the constitutional obligation of  
contract.  
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4.1. Judgment Must Be Grounded in Agreement or Proven Facts  
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In family law cases, especially those invoking irreconcilable differences, a mutual  
agreement (settlement) between the parties is often the most legitimate and constitutionally  
grounded basis for judgment. The obligation of contracts, enshrined in Article I, Section  
10 of the U.S. Constitution, underscores that enforceable judgments must rest on either:  
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• An express agreement between parties (a form of private contract), or  
• A clear showing of facts and law that supports the Plaintiff’s claims.  
In the absence of both, a judgment that aligns with the Plaintiff’s demands lacks a valid  
constitutional and procedural foundation.  
4.2. Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof (▲)  
In civil proceedings, while the standard is not “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the burden of  
proof still lies with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff initiates the action, and therefore must  
establish the facts and arguments necessary to justify judicial intervention against the  
Defendant.  
If the Plaintiff fails to prove their claims, or fails to settle, and especially when there is no  
mutual agreement on the outcome, there is no legal justification to grant the Plaintiff’s  
proposed judgment. In that context, fairness and legal consistency require that the court  
defer to the Defendant’s positions, particularly when no wrongdoing has been established.  
This approach respects both:  
• The presumption of regularity and innocence toward the Defendant, and  
• The principle that courts must not act without a solid legal basis.  
4.3. Irreconcilable Differences Do Not Justify Imbalanced Judgments  
In no-fault divorce cases based on "irreconcilable differences," the law recognizes the  
breakdown of mutual agreement, but does not shift burdens of ownership, asset  
division, or legal consequences automatically in favor of one party. When no agreement  
has been reached—particularly regarding property, custody, or support—there is no  
contractual or consensual foundation for the court to rely on.  
- 28 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
       
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
If the Plaintiff fails to prosecute effectively or declines to engage in settlement, the  
Defendant’s positions should form the basis for resolution. To do otherwise—especially  
where no fault or breach is found—creates an arbitrary exercise of judicial power and risks  
violating due process.  
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4.4. Preventing One-Sided Judgments Without Foundation  
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This safeguard is necessary to prevent one party (typically the Plaintiff) from leveraging  
inertia, bias, or procedural imbalance to obtain a favorable judgment in the absence of  
merit or agreement. Especially where the Defendant is self-represented, the risk of a  
judgment by default or asymmetry is high. GF4 ensures that justice is based on substance,  
not strategy.  
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GF5: ELISOR must require a medical opinion showing a mental impairment of Defendant.  
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5.1. Leading Argument: Signing Away Someone's Rights Requires Proof of Incapacity  
The appointment of an elisor — someone who signs legal documents on behalf of another  
party — is an extraordinary judicial intervention. It overrides the personal agency of a  
party and allows another individual (usually the court or a third party) to act in their legal  
and financial place.  
This should never be done lightly, especially in the absence of a medical diagnosis  
showing that the party is mentally incapacitated and unable to make legal decisions.  
GF5 proposes that no elisor may be appointed to sign for a self-represented  
Defendant unless a qualified medical professional has diagnosed the  
Defendant with a mental impairment that renders them legally incompetent  
to act in their own interest.  
5.2. Capacity Is a Medical Determination — Not a Judicial Shortcut  
• A court is not a medical institution.  
• Judges and opposing attorneys are not licensed mental health professionals.  
• Legal capacity — the ability to understand and manage one's own affairs — must be  
determined by objective medical evidence, not speculation, frustration, or  
procedural convenience.  
Without a mental health evaluation, appointing an elisor is a violation of the Defendant’s  
constitutional rights, particularly:  
• The right to due process  
• The right to personal autonomy  
• The right to control one's own property and legal affairs  
- 29 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
       
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
5.3. In My Case, No Such Diagnosis Was Ever Made  
In this case, no psychiatrist, psychologist, or licensed doctor ever declared that I was  
mentally impaired. Yet the court appointed an elisor to sign documents on my behalf, as if  
I had been declared incompetent.  
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This was a clear abuse of discretion and a breach of my civil rights. It essentially treated  
me as mentally disabled without any medical evidence, simply because I objected to  
terms I believed were unjust.  
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5.4. Elisor Appointment Without Medical Basis = Judicial Overreach  
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The appointment of an elisor without a medical diagnosis introduces several dangerous  
legal consequences:  
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• It creates a false legal record, as if the party signed willingly.  
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• It transfers assets or rights under the false presumption of consent.  
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• It erodes the integrity of the judgment, since it is based on substituted action  
rather than genuine agreement.  
This is particularly dangerous when the party is self-represented, as there are no attorneys  
to raise immediate objections or appeal the decision in real time.  
5.5 Proposed Rule for Safeguard (GF5)  
Before appointing an elisor for a self-represented Defendant, the court must  
require and review a formal medical opinion issued by a licensed mental health  
professional stating that the Defendant is mentally incapacitated and unable to  
act in their own legal interest.  
5.6 Conclusion of GF5  
Judges cannot assign someone to sign away another person’s rights without hard  
evidence that the person is legally incompetent. This safeguard prevents abuse of  
authority, fraudulent transfers, and irreversible harm — particularly against self-  
represented litigants who are already at a procedural disadvantage.  
GF5 is a necessary legal safeguard to uphold the due process rights and personal agency  
of Defendants.  
GF6: The self-represented Defendant should never pay attorney fees  
The core principle behind self-representation is to avoid the financial burden of hiring a legal  
practitioner by choosing to perform the legal work independently. This is not merely a matter  
of preference, but of economic necessity and constitutional right. Imposing attorney’s  
fees on a self-represented litigant defeats the very purpose of self-representation and  
- 30 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
         
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
serves as a punitive measure against individuals who seek justice without the benefit of  
counsel.  
6.1. Structural Imbalance: A Shift from Two Parties to Three  
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Attorney’s fees fundamentally alter the structure of the legal conflict. A case that begins as a  
dispute between two parties (Plaintiff vs. Defendant) effectively transforms into a  
triangular conflict:  
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• Defendant vs. Plaintiff  
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• Defendant vs. Plaintiff’s Attorney  
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This dynamic results in an inherent imbalance—one self-represented litigant pitted against  
two experienced legal professionals: opposing counsel and, often implicitly, a legal culture  
that favors representation.  
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It is akin to a boxing match in which one fighter must face two opponents in the same ring.  
The asymmetry undermines fairness and transforms the court into a space where  
procedural power outweighs the merits of the case.  
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6.2 Attorney’s Fees as a Coercive Tool  
Attorney's fees have been used as a disincentive and deterrent against rightful legal  
challenges. Even when a self-represented party has legal merit, the threat of exorbitant fee  
awards—exceeding $75,000—pressures them into surrendering legitimate claims. This  
practice does not serve justice; it discourages it.  
When attorney’s fees are attached to a losing outcome, the courtroom becomes a financial  
risk rather than a forum for truth. The higher the financial stakes, the greater the probability  
that a self-represented litigant will abandon their rights—not because they lack merit, but  
because they cannot afford to continue.  
6.3 Perverse Incentives and Judicial Dilemma  
The current system places the judge in an ethical bind. If the judge rules in favor of the self-  
represented party, this may deprive the opposing attorney of anticipated compensation. If  
the judge rules against the self-represented party—despite the legal merit—it may serve to  
satisfy the expectations of the attorney’s office. This undermines the judicial role as an  
impartial arbiter and introduces external financial pressures into decision-making.  
As I experienced in this case, prevailing would have resulted in little or no financial gain  
for Plaintiff’s attorney. Conversely, if I lost—even partially—a substantial portion of my life  
savings would have flowed to Plaintiff’s counsel. That structural imbalance threatens the  
integrity of the entire legal process.  
6.4 Proposed Safeguard  
To restore fairness, I propose that when one party is self-represented, the other party  
should never be entitled to attorney’s fees from the self-represented litigant,  
- 31 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
       
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
regardless of the case outcome. This rule would remove perverse incentives and leave the  
judge with only one guiding principle: pure justice.  
6.5 Conclusion GF6: Justice Should Not Depend on Representation  
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The legal system must not allow a party’s inability to afford counsel to become a basis for  
financial punishment. Ordering a self-represented litigant to pay the attorney’s fees of the  
opposing side does not advance equity; it destroys it.  
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"Justice, justice you shall pursue..." – Deuteronomy 16:20  
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Not wealth, not expediency—justice.  
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- 32 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
 
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
2
CONCLUSION  
-▲-  
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This appeal challenges not only the judgment rendered but the fairness of the process itself.  
The trial court failed to investigate credible evidence of hidden assets and allowed  
procedural imbalances that disadvantaged a self-represented Defendant. Serious concerns  
were raised about judicial neutrality, attorney misconduct, and the denial of due process.  
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The six proposed safeguards (GF1–GF6) aim to prevent such injustices by ensuring  
fairness for unrepresented litigants, requiring accountability in court procedures, and  
restoring balance in adversarial proceedings.  
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I respectfully ask the Court to recognize these failures, consider the proposed reforms, and  
take appropriate corrective action to ensure that justice is both served and seen to be  
served.  
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing  
is true and correct.  
Respectfully submitted,  
Digitally signed  
by Mikhael  
Lerman  
Date: 2025.08.13  
23:43:36 -07'00'  
____________________________  
Mikhael Y. Lerman  
Defendant and Appellant  
2462 Booksin Ave – San Jose CA 95125  
michael_lerman@yahoo.com  
408-564-9578  
- 33 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
 
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT  
-▲-  
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I hereby certify that this petition for review contains 10657 words, including footnotes. In  
making this certification, I have relied on the word count of the computer program used to  
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prepare the document. Executed under penalty of perjury at San Jose, California.  
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Digitally signed by  
Mikhael Lerman  
Date: 2025.08.13  
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23:43:03 -07'00'  
____________________________  
Mikhael Y. Lerman  
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2462 Booksin Ave – San Jose CA 95125  
michael_lerman@yahoo.com  
408-564-9578  
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PROOF OF SERVICE  
-▲-  
At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.  
My residence: 2462 Booksin Ave, San Jose CA 95125.  
I mailed, or personally delivered a copy of this documents:  
[51]_Appellant_Opening_Brief.pdf  
[57] APPELANT'S APPENDIX  
[56]_show_cause_not_premature.pdf  
Notice of entry of judgment  
Person served  
Larry Peterson: 2021 The Alameda, Suite 160, San Jose CA 95126  
Eva Martelle: 2076 Lincoln Ave, San Jose, CA 95125  
Superior Court of California, 191 North 1st Street San Jose CA 95113  
Date: 8/14/2025  
___________________________  
Grace Trout  
- 34 -  
[51] Appellant's Opening Brief  
   
Plaintiff and Respondent: CELINE E. LERMAN  
Defendant and Appelant: MIKHAEL Y. LERMAN  
TABLE OF CONTENT  
Super. Ct No: 22FL000408  
Ct of Appeal No: H053267  
1
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CITED  
-▲-  
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[32]_Oberkampf_facts.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_BLE_Bleed_of_attorney_fees_and_sanctions.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_CE_Power_of_Attorney_and_Perimetre_of_accounts.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_COM_letter_commissioner.pdf (cited ◄)  
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Exhibit_DED_DEED_Real_Estate_Fraud.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_ET_extorsion_by_Allan_and_Martelle_LLP.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_EX_exparte_communication.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_HA_Hidden_Assets_Fox_Detective.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_MNO_MINUTE_ORDER_APRIL_3_2025.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_OP_Oberkampf_Photos.pdf (cited ◄)  
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Exhibit_P_Petitioner_Schedule_Assets_Debts.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_PET_Petition_to_supreme_court.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_PRS_strike_assignment_of_judge_Cindy_Hendrickson.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_PZL_puzzle.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_Q_Rue_de_Maubeuge_donation_tranlated.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_TH_Threatning.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_TR_transcript_stevenson.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_ULT_Peterson_Threatning_with_ULTIMATUM.pdf (cited ◄)  
Exhibit_VID_Family_video_rue_oberkampf.pdf (cited ◄)  
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[51] Appellant's Opening Brief